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Chapter nine 
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While there is probably fairly general agreement that the system of indi-
vidual welfare rights that has been built up over the years should not be 
dismantled, there is still dispute at the margin about whether the right 
balance has been achieved between legalism and discretion, and thus 
`between precedence and innovation, precision and flexibility and be-
tween equity and adequacy'.' By legalism is meant the allocation of 
welfare benefits or services on the basis of legal rules and precedent. By 
discretion is meant the allocation of welfare benefits or services on the 
basis of individual judgments. 
Tawney has said that: 2 
The services establishing social rights can boast no lofty pedigree. 
They crept piecemeal into apologetic existence, as low grade 
palliatives designed at once to relieve and to conceal the realities 
of poverty. 
Nevertheless the development of social policy can be characterised 
as a movement from discretion to legalism. Even up until the Second 
World War 'welfare' — whether alms, charity, poor relief or unemploy-
ment assistance — was allocated for the most part on the basis of discre-
tionary judgments about the deserving nature of each individual case. 
There was no sense of legal entitlement — the applicant was a supplicant 
and the poor law guardians, the charities and the officials of the Unem-
ployment Assistance Board would not have conceived that their bene-
ficiaries should have rights. 
The turning point in the movement from discretion to rights came 
with the great spate of social legislation in the late 1940s — the Family 
Allowance Act 1945, the National Insurance Act 1946, the National 
Health Service Act 1946, the Education Act 1944 and the National 
Assistance Act 1948. The broad aspiration of this legislation was to 
ensure a minimum standard of living for all as of right: everyone would 
be entitled to free medical treatment, everyone would have equal access 
to education, contributors would receive social insurance benefits as of 
right, and there was even an entitlement to national assistance once need 
had been proved. The consumer of welfare was no longer a supplicant 
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beholden to the giver but a citizen claiming his legal entitlement. These 
at least were the aspirations. 
T. H. Marshall has distinguished between three components of citi-
zenship in Britain: 3 civil, political and social rights. During the eight-
eenth century we had achieved (at least on paper) civil rights — those 
necessary for individual freedom such as liberty of person, freedom of 
speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and make valid 
contracts, and the right to justice. During the nineteenth century we 
achieved political rights through adult suffrage. During the twentieth 
century we have begun to introduce social rights — the right to live the 
life of a civilised person according to the standards of society. While 
civil and political rights are for the most part recognised and enforced, 
social rights such as the right to a decent standard of living, to a reason-
able house, to an adequate education, are frequently neither recognised 
nor enforced. 
Neither are these basic social rights declared in any general way in 
Britain because we have no written constitution or Bill or Rights. How-
ever we are signatories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which states inter alia:4 
Every human being has a right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well being of his family. 
The United Nations' Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1966 declares more specific rights to insurance, family benefits, 
adequate food, clothing and housing and physical and mental health, 
and education. But the European Convention on Human Rights (1966) 
(which has specific articles dealing with social rights) is the only cove-
nant for which citizens have access for the redress of grievances (through 
the European Court of Human Rights). Britain is a signatory to both of 
these international agreements. 
The movement from discretion to rights in social policy has been 
associated with the increasing intervention of the state in human affairs. 
It has been part of the movement away from the laissez-faire individua-
lism of the nineteenth century. Citizens' welfare is no longer only (or 
mainly) left to the private market or charity. The state's role is no 
longer residual but institutional. It is the state that has responsibility 
now for maintaining basic social rights. This shift in the relationship 
between the individual and state has brought about the fundamental 
change in the principles of English law which are at the root of much of 
the discussion about legalism and discretion. It is to this, the relationship 
between justice and administration, that we now turn. 
li :
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Justice and administration 
Writing at the turn of the century Dicey claimed: 5 
It would be a grave mistake if the recognition of the growth of 
official law in England . . . led any Englishman to suppose there 
exists in England as yet any true administrative law. 
Dicey believed that the only true justice was legal justice character-
ised by the appligation of a body of law within an institutional frame-
work by a judicial mind. However, with the extension of government 
from one field fb another there arose a need for a technique of adjudi-
cation better fitted to respond to the social requirements of the time. 
It was impossible for the State to extend the functions of government 
as long as its activities were limited by the individualistic ideas which 
prevailed in the courts of law. One result of this has been that admini-
stration has made inroads on what was previously the preserve of the 
legislature and the courts. 
In fact as Robson 6 points out there has been a long tradition in the 
English constitution of a mingling of administrative and judicial func-
tions from the time of the King's Council and the Star Chamber, in the 
Court of Requests and Courts of Chancery and later in the work of 
Justices of the Peace who, according to the Webbs, mixed judicial deci-
sions, administrative orders, and legislative resolutions.' 
Though many of the orders were plainly discretional and determined 
only by the justice's view of social expediency, they were all assumed 
to be based on evidence of fact and done in strict accordance with 
the law. 
The gradual separation of judicial and administrative functions never 
reached completion. Coroners and Returning Officers still have both 
judicial and administrative functions and judges still have extensive ad-
ministrative duties. Most of the administrative functions of JPs were 
transferred to local government but they still retain some administrative 
functions in prisons, the probation service and the police authority. 
However with the vast extension of the work of government there 
developed a new body of administrative law that gave discretionary 
judicial powers to the administration outside the traditional structure 
of legal institutions. 8 
The revival of administrative law in England is very largely due to 
the creation of new types of offences against the community, the 
growth of a new conception of social rights, an enhanced solicitude 
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for the common good and a lessening of a belief in divinity of 
extreme individualistic rights which was evinced in the early nine-
teenth century. 
Dicey would have viewed this growth of discretionary powers by 
government officials, even if they were subject to control by administra-
tive tribunals, with disdain. He would have held that administrative 
justice would sap the foundations of precedence and judicial case law 
and be subject to political influence. However Robson defended the 
development of administrative law. 9 
Again and again in the history of civilisation what appeared at first 
as an arbitrary discretion wielded by an irresponsible official gradu-
ally crystallized into a body of known, ascertainable and consistently 
applied law. 
He thought that as long as administrative discretion retains the 
character of justice and the spirit of justice there is no reason why the 
administration should not be as capable as the judiciary in administering 
justice. Justice demands that the decisions made by authority are com-
paratively regular and stable, are more or less consistent, and that 
self-interest and emotion are as far as possible eliminated. Judges are 
trained to administer law with consistency; impartiality and judicial 
discretion must be exercised, as Halsbury said, in accordance with l° 
the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion, 
according to law and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague and 
fanciful but legal and regular. 
Modern Diceyists attack administrative discretion on two fronts. 
These are that: 
(1) Administrative discretion undermines substantive rights. The 
bureaucracy intervenes to thwart the aspirations of legislators so that 
rights enacted in law do not get implemented; and 
(2) Administrative discretion does not meet the requirements of con-
sistency and impartiality and in practice is either amateurish, inquisitor-
ial and moralizing; or in an attempt to match judicial discretion, a mass 
of rules are created which result in wooden uniformity. The procedures 
of administrative discretion do not meet the criteria of justice. 
Those who continue to defend the exercise of discretion by the ad-
ministration are inclined to make the distinction between proportional 
(equitable) justice and creative (individualised) justice. Any system 
of welfare requires the capacity to respond to the special needs and 
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circumstances of each individual. It needs this element of flexible indi-
vidualised justice as Titmuss says: 11 
In order to allow a universal rights scheme, based on principles of 
equity, to be as precise and inflexible as possible. These characteri-
stics of precision, inflexibility and universality depend for their 
sustenance and strength on the existence of some element of flexible 
individualised justice. But they do not need stigma. The essential 
problem is to find the right balance. 
and Olive Stevenson says: 12 
It is somewhat ironic that in a shift from eligibility to entitlement 
and in the reaction against the degrading procedures by which 
eligibility was sometimes established, there may be a new kind of 
injustice in which the individual finds there is no rule to fit his 
own case. 
Discretion as a threat to substantive rights 
The actual nature of social or welfare rights is difficult to discern. It 
is doubtful if some of them exist in law (there is for example no law 
providing the right of the homeless to a house). Even where there is a 
right in law, the mode of delivery may turn a right into a discretion (and 
vice versa). A category of the population may have a right to a benefit 
or service but the test of category may involve a discretionary judgment 
and the actual service provided may be limited by discretion. Most wel-
fare rights are fenced in by qualifying conditions and those qualifying 
conditions inevitably involve discretionary judgments. In some cases 
that discretion is more or less governed by rules and not left to human 
caprice. Thus a decision on national insurance about whether an unem-
ployment benefit claimant is eligible for benefit is made on the basis of 
his contributory record, whether he is available for work and for what 
reasons he is unemployed. All this is governed by the legislation itself 
and by precedents determined by the National Insurance Commissioners 
and the High Court. If he is not satisfied with the decision made on his 
claim he can appeal to a local tribunal and upward through the Insur-
ance Commissioners to the High Court. On the other hand what does 
the right to health care on the basis of medical need mean? It is certainly 
not enforceable through the courts and it is subject to administrative 
discretion: a clinical judgment is made about diagnosis and treatment 
r
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and the care which is received is not only dependent on the judgment 
of doctors but the availability of facilities. 
One example of how the stated intentions of legislators can be medi-
ated by the executive is the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act. 
Alfred Morris MP obtained all-party support for a comprehensive Private 
Member's Bill giving local authorities mandatory duties to trace the 
handicapped in their area and ensure they are informed of the help 
available under the Act. Local authorities were also required to make 
services available to those disabled in need in their area. However, when 
it came to enforcing this legislation, things began to go wrong. First, its 
implementation was delayed because Sir Keith Joseph felt that social 
services departments were too busy. When he did issue the order, it 
recommended not full identification of the disabled, but sample surveys. 
In the absence of a clear lead from the government, the County Councils' 
Association and Association of Municipal Corporations issued a circular 
to local authorities which Alfred Morris described as 'a disturbing and 
shocking manoeuvre' — 'a hard-faced and cynical blueprint for diluting 
and evading the purpose of the law'. The associations recommended 
that before local authorities gave a disabled person a telephone, he 
must be unable to leave home and at risk when left alone and have no 
family or friend within reach of the house and be physically and men-
tally capable of using the telephone and unable to afford the cost him-
self and it would be unreasonable to ask relatives and he must know 
someone he can telephone! 
The Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act was implemented 
unevenly between different authorities; though the Act gives authorities 
a mandatory duty to provide services where need exists it leaves it to 
them to decide what constitutes need. If an authority admits a need 
and refuses to provide assistance, then a case may lie for the Secretary 
of State to seek an order of mandamus to enforce the local authority. 
In practice a local authority is unlikely to be silly enough to accept that 
a need exists and risk court action, and no case has been taken. I3 The 
legislation may have been unrealistic and ill conceived but nevertheless 
the discretion left to the administration had the effect of overturning 
the intention of reformers. 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s in almost every area of social 
policy it became clear that the hopes that had been invested in the re-
forms of the previous decade were not being achieved. The evidence of 
widespread and continuing poverty, poor housing, educational depriva-
tion, difficulties of access to health and welfare, even the failure of the 
legal system to reach out to all, brought disillusion. These problems 
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arose partly as a result of the shortage of resources and partly as a failure 
of legislation to cover certain groups adequately. However part of the 
fault lay at the delivery stage — at the interface between the client, 
claimant or patient and the service. The authorities were less than ener-
getic in selling their service and benefits, and many are unaware of their 
rights. (A recent example of this is the finding by Rosemary Newnham 
that half of the council tenants evicted by Edinburgh Corporation for 
rent arrears were eligible and not claiming rent rebates.") Others were 
deterred by the organisational form of the service." For example the 
condition of supplementary benefit offices and those forbidding hatches 
common in council offices which have to be leaned through at waist 
level to obtain attention, seem designed as a symbolic deterrent. These 
are trivial examples, but what they reflect is the ambivalence with which 
many social policies are implemented, financed and administered. As 
Titmuss said: 16 
Many need-eligibility programmes are basically designed to keep 
people out; not let them in. Moreover, they are often so administered 
as to induce among customers a sense of shame, guilt or failure in 
using a public service. 
One suggested reason for the fact that entitlements for the poor are not 
being effectively enforced is that the poor have been and still are seen 
as in some way blameworthy." The attempts by the 'welfare rights 
movement' to affirm or reaffirm the existence of these rights is a reflec-
tion of their belief that poverty is primarily the consequence of imper-
sonal forces. We shall return to this conflict in values at the end of the 
chapter. 
Discretion as a threat to procedural rights 
Every measure which produces the possibility of beneficent state 
action necessarily produces at the same time the possibility of the 
abuse of power." 
The discretionary power that has been invested in administration 
has raised a host of issues concerning the rights of welfare recipients. 
Much of the criticisms of discretion in relation to procedural rights have 
been directed at the supplementary benefit scheme, but in local govern-
ment and particularly in social work, discretionary judgments are made 
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with less regard to principles of justice and with less adequate procedures 
for the redress of grievance. ° 
The law of social welfare grew up on the theory that welfare is a 
`gratuity' furnished by the state and thus may be subject to what-
ever conditions the state sees fit to impose. 
Recipients are therefore subject to forms and procedures and control 
not imposed on other citizens. They are subject to the tendency of 
moralists to prescribe what is best. The administration may seek to im-
pose moral standards on welfare recipients: Louisiana cut off aid in cases 
where mothers gave birth to an illegitimate child, and discrimination 
between categories of single parents in the provision of exceptional need 
payments may be influenced by the moral valuation of officers." In-
vestigation of eligibility necessarily and inevitably results in some inva-
sion of privacy, but procedures for investigation for cohabitation and 
the policy of a housing department that keeps press cuttings of criminal 
charges on its tenants may be invasions of privacy. Two common inva-
sions of rights derive from the Elizabethan poor law: the attempt to 
impose duties for financial responsibility beyond those normally ex-
pected 21 and the practice of insisting on residence qualifications for 
benefits — still a common requirement on housing waiting lists. Welfare 
authorities may also seek to control other aspects of a recipient's life 
beyond what is acceptable to non-recipients — they can decide what 
work the recipient can be compelled to do, they can impose standards 
of behaviour on their tenants and even in some States in America re-
quire loyalty oaths in order to receive benefits. Perhaps the most com-
mon characteristic of the welfare process is that of secrecy. In justice 
the law must be known or at least ascertainable, but much decision 
making in social policy is based on secret criteria or no criteria at all. 
The Cullingworth Committee 22 was critical of local authorities' reluct-
ance to divulge the basis of their schemes for allocating council houses 
and every day the staff of social service departments make 'professional' 
decisions about whether to provide aid to the handicapped or help 
under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act, 23 or a home 
help to an old person, without ascertainable criteria and without redress. 
Redress is perhaps the key to these procedural issues. As de Smith has 
said: 24 
Public authorities are set up to govern and administer and if their 
every act or decisions were to be reviewable on unrestricted grounds 
by an independent judicial body, the business of administration 
would be brought to a standstill. 
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Nevertheless rights lawyers argue: that because administrative discretion 
in welfare involves important decisions over the people's lives they 
should be subject to basic safeguards; that there are fewer opportunities 
for a fair hearing in welfare decisions; and that of all areas of administra-
tive discretion, the opportunities for the redress of grievance are least 
developed.25 Where in the exception there is access to tribunals such as 
in supplementary benefits, these tribunals do not meet the criteria of 
openness, fairness and impartiality that natural justice demands. 26 (See 
also the chapter on 'The Redress of Grievance'.) 
Welfare rights movement 
It is against this background that a new assertion of legalism in welfare 
has developed in Britain. Many diverse influences have gone into this 
`welfare rights movement'. It has been developed in Britain by social 
workers influenced by the writings of Wootton" and Sinfield 28 and 
disturbed by the material problems of their clients, by lawyers con-
cerned that a large section of the public does•not get access to the legal 
advice and assistance that they need, and principally by the Child Poverty 
Action Group. The antecedents of the movement are in the USA where 
through action in the courts, lawyers and social workers managed to get 
laid down what low income families should get, item by item. It is an 
attempt to define poverty in terms of a denial of rights and to alter the 
status of the client from a supplicant appealing for handouts to a claim-
ant demanding his entitlements. It is based on the principle that society 
has through legislation accepted a commitment to provide certain bene-
fits and services, and if people are not getting those rights then the 
agencies of the law are failing in their repsonsibility. Thus the welfare 
rights movement is concerned with the manipulation of the law in 
clients' favour and the pushing of the law to its furthest limits to extend 
the generosity of the service. As Tony Lynes has said, it is a classically 
Fabian strategy. 29 
The hotchpotch of pressure groups, claimants and community 
groups and advice services that make up the welfare rights movement 
have been active in three main areas. 3° First, they have been concerned 
to enforce welfare rights through the provision of information and 
advice. They have sought to improve the availability of benefits directly 
through advice and information and indirectly by revealing to local and 
national agencies their failure to publicise the benefits and services. 
Second, welfare rights workers have begun to advocate on behalf of 
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claimants. The American welfare rights movement thought that: 31 
campaigns to double and triple the relief rolls would produce signifi-
cant pressure for national reforms in the relief system, perhaps along 
the lines of a national guaranteed common income. 
The British welfare rights aspirations have been less ambitious. Their 
activities have varied from writing letters asking for written explanations 
of how benefits are assessed, or for exceptional needs payments, to 
representing claimants at tribunals. Tribunals, through their advocacy 
have been persuaded to take a different view from the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission on such things as monthly visits of prisoners' 
wives, school sports kits, and fees for heavy goods vehicle driving lessons. 
Third, the welfare rights movement has sought to extend poor people's 
rights by using the law. This strategy developed in the USA where a 
written constitution which guarantees safeguards to their citizens and 
a Supreme Court is able to interpret that constitution and to bind by 
its decisions both Congress and the State legislatures. 32 
The lawyers expected that as a result of their successful cases the 
world would change in favour of the poor. Unfortunately the high 
hopes have not been fulfilled. Crucial decisions by the Supreme 
Court have been open to varying interpretations and there has been 
a backlash. In welfare rights, particularly, state legislatures, in order 
to abide by the letter of the decisions, have reduced benefit entitle-
ment to save the public purse. 
In Britain with no written constitution and no supreme court, it has 
been necessary to take social legislation in a piecemeal fashion. In some 
precedent-making cases, rights lawyers have revived forgotten laws to 
extend rights. In Nottingham Corporation v Newton (1974 2 AER 760) 
the court affirmed the right of tenants to use section 99 of the Public 
Health Act 1936 to summon local authorities before the magistrates' 
courts in order to obtain orders for repairs to be carried out on their 
houses. Another type of precedent-making case has been the attempt 
by lawyers to challenge official interpretations of the law. The Child 
Poverty Action Group has sought leave to take a series of test cases to 
the High Court challenging the decisions of supplementary benefit ap-
peal tribunals and in effect the SBC's interpretation of social security 
legislation. In R v Greater Birmingham Appeal Tribunal (ex p. Simper) 
(1973 2 WLR 709) the court held that the commission's use of discre-
tion in relation to allowances for heating was wrong and as a result 
extra heating allowances were paid to thousands of new claimants. 
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Another case successfully challenged the commission's interpretation of 
the Family Income Supplement Act. 33 A series of cases have also been 
taken to the National Insurance Commissioner which have extended the 
Attendance Allowance Board's interpretation of the eligibility criteria. 34 
The use of test cases to maintain or extend rights is only in its infancy 
and its achievements have been limited. As well as the successes there 
have been harmful results.In McPhail v Persons Unknown (1973 3 WLR 
71) a case which originated as an attempt to extend the rights of squat-
ters, their rights were in fact greatly restricted. Legislation used in the 
courts to advance rights can be repealed or amended by policy makers —
this occurred in the Simper case. The legal procedures for getting prero-
gative orders of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus from the High 
Court are complex and expensive 35 and it is not at all clear that judges 
are really prepared to become involved in vetting administrative discre-
tion: in one recent case 36 the judges indicated their unwillingness to 
interfere with a tribunal's decision even if it was erroneous in law. 
The defence of discretion 
Much of the debate about legalism and discretion in the last decade has 
centred on the supplementary benefits scheme. One in thirteen of the 
population of the UK are dependent in whole or part for their income 
on supplementary benefits and far from becoming a residual service for 
those who failed to qualify for insurance benefits as Beveridge intended, 
the supplementary benefit scheme has become the prop for the whole 
social security edifice. As with most assistance schemes supplementary 
benefit has an area of flexibility at the margin and this flexibility is em-
bodied in the discretionary powers of the officials to meet needs not 
covered by the scale rates of benefit. Claimants desperate to supplement 
the scale rates have turned to these discretionary additions for extra 
help. At first little was known about what could be obtained in the way 
of these additions and in what circumstances because the SBC ad-
ministrative rule used by officers (the A code) was governed by the 
Official Secrets Act. As a result of pressure from the welfare rights move-
ment more and more information has been published in hand books 
and guides and over a third of claimants now obtain Exceptional Needs 
Payments and Exceptional Circumstances Additions each year. The ex-
pansion of discretionary payments has been a source of continual dispute 
and presented the Commission with an enormous extra administrative 
burden. David Donnison, the Chairman of the Supplementary Benefits 
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Commission, has argued 37 that the Commission cannot go on providing 
these additions on an individual basis. The current government review 
of supplementary benefits is likely to standardise policy and procedures. 
This may reduce the area of discretion and increase the area of right but 
it may also reduce the capacity in the system to relate benefit to need. 
Titmuss, when vice chairman of the SBC, in a biting attack on the 
`pathology of legalism' stoutly defended this area of flexible individua-
lised justice. 38 
Just where the line should be drawn between legalised basic rights 
and discretionary additions is a problem which a fully legalised 
system based on case law and precedent cannot even begin to con-
sider. It is however a constant challenge to any system like the 
supplementary benefits scheme which continues to recognise the 
need for individualised justice. 
The other area of dispute on supplementary benefits concerns the 
conflict inherent in the scheme between providing a humane service to 
those cast aside by the economic and social system and the need to 
maintain the values which maintain that system. In practice the supple-
mentary benefit scheme maintains social values through a set of controls. 
Two of these controls are concerned with the work ethic and the family 
ethic. Procedures for unemployment review, rules about benefit for 
strikers, and the level of benefit itself all operate as incentives to return 
to work. The activity of the rights movement was successful in getting 
two other procedures concerned with the work ethic — the four week 
rule and the wage stop — abolished. The supplementary benefits system 
also bolsters the family with powers to pursue erring husbands and 
putathie fathers (liable relatives) and more controversially through the 
cohabitation rule. The Commission have been at pains to argue that the 
rule is intended to ensure that no unmarried couple living together as 
man and wife are better off than married couples. 39 Although they have 
refined and reviewed the procedures governing the rule more than once, 
in practice the rule still results in many single mothers having their bene-
fit withdrawn without a hearing and as a result of a judgment about the 
nature of their relationship with a man. 49 
The discretionary basis of these controls has satisfied no one. Clai-
mants and their representatives identify them as the principle source of 
injustice in the system and yet there is still a bitter chorus of vilification 
against scroungers and the workshy, and demands for stiffer controls. 
Officials administering their discretion find it the most difficult and 
odious part of their work. So far attempts to get the courts to intervene, 
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to provide for instance a legal definition of cohabitation, have so far 
been unsuccessful. The supplementary benefits tribunals do not provide 
a satisfactory mechanism for the protection of rights and the scrutiny 
of official discretion. The Ombudsman cannot give a ruling on the justice 
of a discretionary decision, only on maladminstration. The success of 
the Commission's own attempts to clarify the basis for their decisions 
and get some consistency in decision making has been reduced by high 
staff turnover, overwork and, because of the size of the operation, the 
inevitable difficulty of getting uniform decisions by hundreds of officers 
with different values, attitudes and beliefs. These factors naturally make 
them fearful of the possibility of having to administer rigid criteria for 
each particular circumstance if the courts or a higher tribunal began to 
impose binding decisions and in a recent lecture Donnison has intimated 
that the Commission should" 
abandon the aspirations to match the benefits we pay to the infinite 
variety of human needs we encounter — the aspiration for creative 
justice. 
Conclusion 
Views about the nature of society and social policy inevitably influence 
attitudes to the question of legalism and discretion. 42 Those who accept 
the consensus model of society where there are no fundamental struc-
tural conflicts of values and interests and where the powers of the state 
are not viewed as a menace to the individual, would believe that discre-
tionary powers will be used to help those in need and disputes will be 
rare and resolved amicably within an accepted framework. In contrast, 
those who see society as a state of dichotomic conflict between those 
who have power, authority and wealth and those who do not, will view 
rights as meaningless. Benefits are a means of social control or a sop to 
help keep down unrest and any control over discretion exists to propa-
gate a consensual view of society. Opponents of the system seek to 
change it by revolution and others despite what they see as its hypocrisy 
try to work the system for the benefit of the needy. Finally there is the 
open mode1: 43 
that of a society which recognises a continuing multiple conflict 
of interests and values taking place within an over-arching structure 
of a more or less fluid or dynamic nature. In this society there are 
not just two sides but many conflicts. 
Legalism and Discretion 153 
Rights are essential in this society because they are the means of manag-
ing these conflicts. 
The fullest discussion of the issue of legalism and discretion is in a 
book by an American lawyer, Kenneth Culp Davis." He has argued that 
although discretion is inevitable and necessary for individualised justice, 
it is often much greater than it should be and it needs to be restricted. 45 
Discretion is a tool indispensable for the individualiization of 
justice.... Discretion is our principal source of creativeness in 
government and in law. Discretion is a tool only when properly used; 
perhaps nine-tenths of injustice in our legal system flows from 
discretion, and perhaps only one tenth from rules. 
Let us not overemphasize either the need for discretion or its 
danger; let us emphasize both the need for discretion and its dangers. 
In his book he goes on to outline a framework that could confine, 
structure and check discretionary power. More meaningful standards 
should be set out in statute, better and more elaborate and more open 
administrative rule making is required to confine and structure discre-
tion, there is a need for improvements in the fairness and accessibility 
of tribunals, and finally for the elimination of barriers to judicial review. 
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